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A POVERTY OF RESPECT: HUMAN RIGHTS, HONOR, DIGNITY
AND RESPECT IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Cecil J. Hunt, II*
I. INTRODUCTION

I am honored to be among the distinguished company gathered at
this conference sponsored by the Albany Law Review and the
Albany Law School to discuss the work and scholarship of Professor
Alan Dershowitz, the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School. Professor Dershowitz's distinguished career
as a trailblazing and courageous Law Professor, appellate advocate,
and public intellectual qualifies him to be one of the most
illustrative members of what Jeffrey Friedman characterizes as the
"group of creative ideological synthesizers who generate the ideas"1
that stimulate others to think more deeply about contentious social
and political issues. Friedman calls these creative synthesizers
"ideologists" and sharply distinguishes them from "ideologues" by
noting that "ideologues are the ones with predictably constrained
political 'attitudes.'
The ideologists are the ones who have
established that these attitudes flow from 'premises about the
2
nature of social justice, social change, "natural law," and the like."'
For example, as Professor Dershowitz has written himself, the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict "is no longer so much between the
Israelis and the Palestinians as it is between those moderate
pragmatists who favor peace and those extremist ideologues who
3
favor a continuation of the conflict, with its resulting bloodshed."
Throughout his career, Professor Dershowitz has been one of the
most passionate supporters and ardent defenders of the embattled
state of Israel in what has been variously referred to as the Israeli* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, A.B. Harvard University, J.D. Boston
College Law School.
I Jeffrey Friedman, Public Competence in Normative and Positive Theory: Neglected
Implications of "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" 18 CRITICAL REV. i, viii (2006).
2

Id. (citation omitted).

3 ALAN DERSHOwiTz, THE CASE FOR PEACE: HOW THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT CAN BE

RESOLVED 4 (2005).
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Palestinian conflict. 4 He has long been a strident voice arguing that
"defending Israel against a double standard is a human rights issue
of the greatest significance." 5 This is why Professor Dershowitz has
always encouraged "reasoned, nuanced, constructive,
and
comparative discussion-including criticism-of Israeli policies and
'6
actions.
Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the entire region has been
engulfed in a cycle of violence and turmoil that has appeared to be a
"seemingly intractable dispute." 7 The political tensions in this area
of the world have given birth to one of the most agonizing, but not
hopeless, 8 political and human rights struggles on the planet. As
both a practical and pragmatic matter, the prospects for peace and
reconciliation between Israel and her Arab neighbors seem as
remote today as they did at the beginning of the conflict. In light of
this political reality, I do not pretend to have any magic answers
that could miraculously resolve the conflict and achieve peace in the
Middle East in a single stroke.
However, this elusive peace is made all the more unattainable by
varying degrees of political and financial corruption on both sides of
the conflict. For many of the principal players in this production,
the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is a wellspring of
considerable political power and economic wealth.
For these
constituencies, by any metric, peace would be enormously bad for
business. But for those true believers on the Israeli side that hold
fast to the attainability of a meaningful and sustainable peace, their
rhetoric of peace would be well served by a leavening dose of a
measurable grammar of respect, honor, and dignity.
This perspective is vitally important because in this conflict,
"respect is the number-one target ...and the first casualty."9 This
riddling of respect is readily evidenced in the Israeli political
rhetoric demeaning Palestinian humanity. For example, in a tone
distressingly representative of the political mainstream of Israeli
views of Palestinian humanity, there has been "a long [political]
tradition of Israeli leaders implying that Palestinians are devoid of

4 See, e.g., Alan Dershowitz, Introduction to WHAT ISRAEL MEANS TO ME 1, 2 (Alan

Dershowitz ed., 2006).
5 Id. at 5.
6 Id.
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 7.
8 JIMMY CARTER, PALESTINE: PEACE NOT APARTHEID 14 (2006).
9 RICHARD BEN CRAMER, How ISRAEL LOST: THE FOUR QUESTIONS 257 (2004).
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values, or not exactly human." 10
In this tradition, in his public pronouncements, Manachem Begin
often referred to Palestinians as 'beasts walking on two legs.""'
Raful Eitan, who served as Begin's chief of staff similarly described
Palestinians as 'drugged cockroaches in a bottle."' 12 Former Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir characterized Palestinians as "a plague of
locusts" who should be 'crushed like grasshoppers ... heads
smashed against the boulders."' 3 Prime Minister Ehud Barak
referred to Palestinians as 'crocodiles-the more you feed them, the
more they want."' 14 In fact, many Israelis have expressed the view
that, to the Palestinians, "'human life means nothing"' and that "[i]f
the Palestinians were not less than human," they were, "at least,
less human than Jews."15
The political facts on the ground in this conflict over the central
contentious issues of "borders, settlements, refugees, and
Jerusalem"' 6 are like tectonic plates that are not likely to shift
forward in any measurable way anytime soon. However, like
Bernard Wasserstein has correctly observed, my "optimism is
founded neither on an unduly rose-coloured view of the harsh facts
of Middle Eastern politics nor on innocent faith in the likelihood of a
sudden outbreak of sweet reasonableness."' 7 Instead, my purpose is
to bring "into the foreground some relatively neglected aspects of
Israeli-Palestinian relations,"' 8 not in terms of the substantive
historical and political debate itself, but rather the context in which
it is framed and conducted.
Toward this end, I want to suggest a new and potentially helpful
perspective on the conflict that consists of looking more closely at
the human rights implications of the cultural, social, and political
values of dignity, honor, and respect on both sides of the ideological
divide. Such an analysis may offer an enhanced perspective on the
central importance of, and the subtle differences between, the
cultural and political interplay of these values, not only to Israelis,
but also to the Arab culture generally and the Palestinian culture
10 Id. at 236.
11 Id.
12 Id.

13 Id. (alteration in original).
14

Id.

15 Id. at 237 (emphasis omitted).
16 BERNARD WASSERSTEIN, ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS: WHY Do THEY FIGHT? CAN THEY

STOP? 140 (2003).
17 Id. at 3.

18 Id. at 2-3.
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specifically. This enhancement may also yield a more nuanced
appreciation of the role that respect plays as a necessary
prerequisite to a recognition of human rights, dignity, and honor in
each of these cultures. A great deal can be learned about the
consciousness and motivations of Palestinians to engage in violent
political resistance and acts of terrorism through the lens of the
relative cultural and political values of human rights, dignity, and
respect from the perspective of the Palestinians as a traditional and
still meaningful honor culture.
Perhaps viewing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from the
perspective of their respective cultural values regarding honor,
dignity, and respect could be accurately characterized as excessively
naive and simplistic. However, even if that is true, and I don't
believe it is, that should not be a barrier to its serious consideration
because the same could be said about the prospects of the creation of
a non-secular Jewish state just a little over fifty years ago. And
that, too, was more achievable than it first appeared.
As Professor Dershowitz has accurately perceived, a lasting peace
in the Arab-Israeli conflict can only come about by the
participation of many people, with
"intervention... [and]
different... worldviews."19 Generally speaking, when the preamble
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that its
signatories mean to "reaffirm[] their faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the
equal rights of men and women," 20 the term "dignity" is properly
understood to be a property interest. It is a right between people
with respect to an intangible thing. It consists of an expectation of
recognition and respect by others, and protection by the sovereignty
of individual conscious and the various recognized central,
collective, and coercive political authorities of both domestic and
international communities.
Analytically, the concept of human dignity is particularly slippery
and elusive, and frustratingly resists a comprehensive or precise
definition. In trying to define this term, Orit Kamir observed that
"[]ike honor in honor cultures, dignity relates to the core of a
person's worth as a human being. It is viewed as an axiomatic
Mindful of this definitional difficulty and
human quality." 21
19 DERSHOWITZ, supranote 3, at 1.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
21 Orit Kamir, Honor and Dignity Cultures: The Case of Kavod and Kvod Ha-Adam in
20
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limitation, perhaps in a fashion similar to the concept of justice,
dignity is best understood in relief against its binary oppositehonor. Socrates famously once observed that honor, which he
characterized as "thymos," was a quality that all humans desired to
attain in the esteem of others. 22 As Socrates described it, the
quality of honor is a natural object of the human soul and the source
of a sense of meaning in life. 23 Michael Lerner expressed a similar
sentiment when he described an aspect of "real oppression" to be a
"deprivation of meaning ...[which] leads people to despair, to
violence, and to living lives of pain every bit as experientially real as
pain generated by poverty." 24 Thus, honor consists of the opinions
of others and a person's view of their esteem in the eyes of their
fellows. From this view of themselves, as supplied by others, honor
can be given or withheld on the basis of the largess of the
community to which one belongs. This sense of honor is the basis
for a social sense of being able to control one's life and thus to have
a sense of one's own meaning within the community. Honor is thus,
at its heart, community-based and others-focused.
In stark contrast, dignity is distinct from both respect and honor
because it is best understood as a quality that all humans already
possess as an inherent function of their humanity, and thus exists
independently from the opinion of others. It is a quality that is
internally experienced and recognized, not one that is externally
bestowed or withheld. Thus, honor must be earned, defended and
maintained. As such it can also be lost, taken, or damaged, either
by one's own actions or the actions of others, and is thus subject to
redemption and restoration. However, dignity is not and, in fact,
cannot, by its very nature, be earned because it is inherent in the
fact of human existence. Thus dignity is inalienable, invariable,
and inviolate. While dignity cannot be lost, taken, or damaged, it
can be disrespected and assaulted and is therefore subject to being
both defended and protected. In short, dignity can be besieged, but
it cannot be conquered.
In a highly controversial New York Times editorial reflecting the

Israeli Society and Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE

231, 241 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).
22 See Paul A. Lee, The Long Lost Last Dialogues of Socrates by Plato 2-3 (1981), available
at http://www.ecotopia.org/paul/lost.html.
23 See Plato, Republic IX, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 1180, 1188-90 (John M. Cooper ed.,
1997).
24

MICHAEL LERNER & CORNEL WEST, JEWS AND BLACKS: LET THE HEALING BEGIN 231

(1995).
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views of many Middle East watchers, author Thomas Friedman
wrote that the essential problem with "Sunni Muslim males, from
London to Riyadh and Bali to Baghdad ...is not about the poverty
of money. [It] is about the poverty of dignity and the rage it can
trigger. ' 25 Whether he appreciated it or not, in using these terms to
describe Arab men throughout the Islamosphere, Friedman's words
constituted a profound affront to Arab honor and dignity. With
specific reference to Palestinian men, the phrase "poverty of dignity"
can reasonably be taken in two ways. First is the assertion that
Palestinians have lost their claim to human dignity or had it so
deprived that they have little or no dignity remaining. As such,
since the United States and Israel are perceived as the cause of this
loss of dignity, they must also be the source of its restoration. Or
second, in a somewhat different context, this description can be
reasonably interpreted as meaning that Palestinian dignity is under
tremendous assault and that, like hope itself, it cannot be
abandoned without grave consequences for those who will then live
with neither hope nor dignity.
Both of these interpretations demonstrate a profound
misunderstanding of the nature of human dignity. This most
fundamental of human qualities is not subject to being either taken
In fact, not only is dignity not
or diminished by suffering.
impoverished by suffering, it can often be ennobled and personified
by suffering. This is true because the suffering endured by those
who resist overwhelming power and domination without a loss or
diminishment of human dignity is a source of respect and triumph
both for those who witness it and those who suffer it. History is
filled with countless examples of the truth of this observation: the
Spanish Inquisition, the French attack and virtual annihilation of
the Knights Templar in the Middle Ages, the eighteenth century
American and French Revolutions, the African slaves who endured
three hundred years of slavery, the World War II underground
resistance to Nazi occupation throughout Europe and the survivors
of Nazi concentration camps and the holocaust, and the prisoner of
war survivors of North Viet Nam's infamous Hanoi Hilton prison
camps.
Those who seek to dominate and suppress others well understand
the power and centrality of human dignity because all of their many

25 Thomas L. Friedman, A Poverty of Dignity and a Wealth of Rage, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2005, at A19.
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acts of what may be accurately characterized as torture, are
designed to elicit information and cooperation by assaulting and
stripping their prisoners of their sense of personal dignity. The
wills of some are broken by these techniques and those of others are
not. But no matter how determined the assault on the citadel of
human dignity, its walls simply cannot be breached.
A simple story may well serve to illuminate this point. In
describing the agonies of survival in the German concentration
camp of Auschwitz, Primo Levi described a man: "Steinlauf, who
continued to wash his hands in [Auschwitz's] dirty water, who
sewed the buttons on his tattered shirt, who stood upright." 26 Levi
went on to describe the power of the quality of dignity when he
wrote that such men said to one another,
So we must certainly wash our faces without soap in dirty
water and dry ourselves on our jackets. We must polish our
shoes, not because the regulation states it, but for dignity
and propriety. We must walk erect, without dragging our
feet, not in homage to Prussian discipline but to remain
27
alive, not to begin to die.
Glenn W. Most summed up the timeless truth of Levi's
description when he wrote, "Every represented torment of the
human body implies a reflection on what it means to be a human
being: and the more radical the former, the more urgent the
latter." 28 In writing about honor in the ancient Roman Republic,
Carlin A. Barton made a similar observation when she described the
Roman reaction to their greatest military defeat at the battle of
Cannae in 216 BCE, where Hannibal's army annihilated the Roman
Barton
army leaving "[flifty thousand dead on the field." 29
described the Roman's stoic reaction to such a crushing defeat by
observing that .'[t]hen, as on no other occasion, true Roman virtus
was revealed.' What you were, finally, was what you could live
without. It was the honed, stripped-down soul that shone with the
greatest splendor." 30 As Barton observed, from ancient times, in
honor cultures like Rome, "'[n]othing is more formidable than

26

CARLIN A. BARTON, ROMAN HONOR: THE FIRE IN THE BONES 6 (2001) (citing PRIMO LEVI,

SURVIVAL

IN AUSCHWITZ: THE NAZI

ASSAULT ON HUMANITY

41

(Stuart Woolf trans.,

Touchstone 1996) (1958)).
27 LEVI, supra note 26, at 41.
28 Glenn W. Most, The Rhetoric

of Dismemberment in Neronian Poetry, in INNOVATIONS OF
ANTIQUITY 391, 409-10 (Ralph Hexter & Daniel Selden eds., 1992).
29 BARTON, supra note 26, at 49.
30 Id. (quoting the imperial historian Florus).
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despair ....
[I]n all the perils of human existence, it was not
victory that mattered so much as that the struggle be 'from the
31
marrow."'
Therefore, in terms of Friedman's charge, there can no more be a
poverty of dignity from suffering, than there can be a poverty of life
32
itself. It is an old saying that "[w]hile there's life, there's hope."
In a similar vein it can also be said that, as a matter of human
rights, wherever there is life there is human dignity. Thus, in the
context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, all the talk from the
Palestinians regarding land and a one state solution can reasonably
be regarded as a type of proxy for a public recognition of honor and
respect, and the cessation of their perception of continuing assaults
on Palestinian dignity and honor by Israel and the United States.
Thus the mantra of "no state-no peace" might just as well be
understood as "no respect and honor-no peace." Therefore, the
concept of a "poverty of dignity" is by definition an oxymoron both in
concept and articulation.
The worldview of the Arab world generally and the Palestinian
view specifically is a function of the fact that these societies are
based on the traditional values and perspectives of an honor
culture. As an honor culture, the Arab view is motivated less by
commonly accepted notions of their hatred of Israel's very
existence 33 than by "the demands of a traditional honor culture to
strike at those whom they see, often for reasons invisible to those
34
outside that culture, as having humiliated them."
As Bowman correctly observes, "The disappearance of the
Western honor culture ... has left us ill prepared to understand
those different 'value systems' we tend to attribute to poverty,
35
ignorance, colonial oppression or some combination of the three."
Further, he argues that it is "wrong thus to patronize these honor
cultures. We may-we do-powerfully disapprove of them, but they

31 Id. at 53 (quoting Roman general Vespasian and the author Apuleius).
32 See MotivationalQuotes.com, Quotations about Hope,
http://www.motivationalquotes.com/pages/hope-quotes.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
33 See CARTER, supra note 8, at 15-16, 18. "Most Arab regimes have accepted the
permanent existence of Israel as an indisputable fact and are no longer calling for an end to
the State of Israel, having contrived a common statement at an Arab summit in 2002 that
offers peace and normal relations with Israel" for its withdrawal from all Arab territories
occupied since 1967, its acceptance of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem
as its capital, and its agreement to a just solution of the Palestinian refugee problem. Id. at
5-6, 14, 52, 207.
3
JAMES BOWMAN, HONOR: A HISTORY 21 (2006).
3 Id.
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exist because many people of cultural traditions different from our
own continue to want to keep them alive, not because they don't
know any better." 36 Professor Dershowitz has also failed to grasp
this cultural distinction, as he writes that as a "root cause," "there is
no such link as a matter of fact or history" "between oppression,
occupation, poverty, and humiliation, on the one hand, and a
37
willingness to blow oneself up for 'the cause,' on the other hand."
The concept of Islamic honor being a sufficiently powerful force to
motivate and sustain Arab and Palestinian resistance is a difficult
one for the Western mind to fully grasp or appreciate. As posthonor cultures, the United States and Israel understandably regard
values of honor as relics of a long forgotten and quaint past.
However, as Bowman correctly observes, 'fet we are, in global
terms, the odd ones out. Our disdain or disregard of the honorable
imperatives cited by others as a reason for action is at least as
bizarre to most of the world as honor seems to us."38 With great
perception, Bowman also notes in this regard, "At some primitive
level, the noncommissioned officers at the Abu Ghraib prison in
Baghdad understood the importance of honor to the Iraqis better
than their superiors, for they understood how to humiliate Arab
39
men and affront their honor."
This is a critically important distinction that the West generally,
and Israel particularly, fails to adequately appreciate because the
poverty that drives the Palestinian resistance is not caused, as
Thomas Friedman has mistakenly concluded, by either the "poverty
of money" or "the poverty of dignity,"40 but rather by a poverty of
respect. It is, therefore, a mistake of great significance to take too
lightly the claims of Arab extremists justifying their acts of terror as
a vindication of their respect, honor, and dignity. This is evidenced
by the fact that, as Bowman correctly observes,
[I]f you look very closely into what the jihadists, or the
various radical groups who support them, have to say about
what they do, you will rarely see any reference to poverty.
Even religion as such seems of less interest to them than the
idea of Arab or Islamic "honor" and "manhood," with which

36
37
38

Id. at 21-22.
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 79 (emphasis added).
BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 23.

39 Id.

40

Friedman, supra note 25, at A19.
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honor is always intimately related. 41
Bowman goes on to conclude that
[h]onor may seek a religious validation, whether Islamic or
Christian... but its exaggerated demands for respect and a
strict code of vengeance for the slightest insults or injuries
remain its own and are not founded in the scriptures or the
customs and practices of either religion.
That is why the most belligerent statements of the terrorists
mention "honor" or "manhood" much more often than they do
42
any distinctively religious concept.
Distressingly, anecdotally, strikingly, and illustratively, evidence
of the fact that Professor Dershowitz, the State of Israel, and the
West all fail to adequately appreciate the Arab perspective on the
imperatives of honor and respect is illustrated by the fact that the
words "dignity," "respect," and "honor" appear nowhere in either the
table of contents or the index of Professor Dershowitz's book, The
Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Can Be Resolved, 43 or
of any of the many other Western books on this enduring conflict,
including former President Jimmy Carter's new book, Palestine:
Peace Not Apartheid.44 This omission is striking and suggests a
degree of insensitivity, even by those most knowledgeable about the
problem, to the imperatives of honor, respect, and dignity in Arab
culture.

II. HONOR CULTURES
In order to more fully understand the significance and
implications of the honor-based Arab and Palestinian cultural
worldview and values, it may be helpful to briefly examine in more
detail the nature of honor, and honor cultures more generally.
William Ian Miller describes honor cultures in the following way:
Honor is above all the keen sensitivity to the experience of
humiliation and shame, a sensitivity manifested by the
desire to be envied by others and the propensity to envy the
successes of others. To simplify greatly, honor is that
disposition which makes one act to shame others who have
41 BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 22.
42 Id. (describing how Osama bin Laden once said in defense of his acts of terrorism, "'We
believe that we are men, Muslim men who must have the honor of defending Mecca").
43 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at vii-viii, 239-46.
44 CARTER,

supra note 8, at ix-x, 251-64.
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shamed oneself, to humiliate others who have humiliated
oneself. The honorable person is one whose self-esteem and
social standing is intimately dependent on the esteem or the
envy he or she actually elicits in others. At root honor means
"don't tread on me." But to show someone you were not to be
trod upon often meant that you had to hold yourself out as
one who was willing to tread on others....
In the culture of honor, the prospect of violence inhered in
virtually every social interaction between free men ....For
shame and envy are quickly reprocessed as anger, and anger
45
often is a prelude to aggression.
James Bowman accurately defines honor as, "[a]t its simplest,...
the good opinion of the people who matter to us, and who matter
because we regard them as a society of equals who have the power
to judge our behavior." 46 Bowman goes on to describe this "society
of equals" as a particular person's "honor group" 47 whose opinions
matter most to them. Bowman defines an honor group as a natural
consequence of a common enterprise where members share common
goals and values, and where an individual's personal physical
strength is an important measure of public esteem, "especially those
like the armed services, police forces, fire brigades and sports
teams," 48 and other like groups. Honor groups are also highly
patriarchal and thus are "male-dominated." 49
The masculine
nature of honor cultures results in a strong emphasis on the
traditional qualities of loyalty, bravery, and physical and
psychological strength.5 0 As Orit Kamir has accurately observed,
"In honor cultures, honor serves as an effective disciplining tool, and
the honor-code is, therefore, a structure of social power. In order to
achieve and maintain honor, an honor culture offers its members
51
specific behavior codes, demanding complete obedience."
In an honor culture, the members of an honor group see and value
themselves through the eyes of one another, at least as much as,
and perhaps even more than, they see and value themselves by
their own internal lights. Since one's sense of honor is so dependent
45 WILLIAM

IAN

MILLER,

HUMILIATION:

AND

OTHER

ESSAYS

DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE 84-85 (1993).
46 BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 4.
47 Id.
48

Id. (some internal punctuation omitted).

49 Id.
50 Id.

at 4-5.
51 Kamir, supranote 21, at 240.
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on how one is viewed by others, the primary underlying value in
honor cultures relates to one's public appearance. 52 Implicit in this
view is that "unlike morality, [honor] is by its very nature relative
to a particular social context" 53 among those that one considers to be
his social peers at any given time.
The value of honor in honor cultures cannot reasonably be
54
bifurcated into types: one primitive and the other acculturated.
Instead, it is more precisely understood as a unitary concept whose
variations are simply manifestations mediated by social context, but
informed by an instinctual "foundational social reflex." 55 Bertram
Wyatt-Brown has described honor as an "ancient ethic [that] was
the cement that held regional culture together." 56 Thus honor in an
honor culture "acts as a kind of 'social glue"' where '[t]he key to
motivation... is the acquisition of honor that brings high
status... and conversely the avoidance of shame."' 57 Although a
single thing, from this perspective honor consists of a "cluster of
ethical rules, most readily found in societies of small communities,
by which judgments of behavior are ratified by community
consensus."5 8 However, as Wyatt-Brown is quick to point out, in an
honor culture, "honor is not confined to any rank of society; it is the
moral property of all who belong within the community." 59 In fact,
in these cultures, honor is such a galvanizing and insular concept
60
that it "determines the community's own membership."
It cannot be overemphasized that honor cultures are
fundamentally based not simply on the acquisition of honor alone
but on an 'avoidance of shame."' 6 1 To this extent, honor cultures

52

But see BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, THE SHAPING OF THE SOUTHERN CULTURE: HONOR,

GRACE, AND WAR, 1760S-1890S, at xiii (2001) (describing a type of personal honor that
"striv[es] for a higher goal" and is not limited to the esteem of others). As an illustration, the
author cites the example of Judge Frank Johnson who, during the civil rights era, was a
southern judge who frequently ruled in favor of black civil rights and suffered a storm of
criticism from his fellow whites in the community as a result. Id.
53 BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 5.
54 But see id. at 6 (dividing the concept into two distinct varieties: "reflexive honor," which
is instinctual, and "cultural honor," which is learned behavior).
55 Id. at 2.
56

BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH,

at xv (1982) [hereinafter WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR].
57 BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 27 (quoting David Pryce-Jones, Shame and Honor, Terribly
Twisted: A Central Truth of Arab Culture is on Full Display in Iraq, NAT'L REV., Apr. 21,
2003, at 36, 37).
58 WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR, supra note 56, at xv.
59 Id.

6o Id.
61

BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 27 (quoting Pryce-Jones, supra note 57, at 37); see also supra

HeinOnline -- 71 Alb. L. Rev. 872 2008

2008]

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

are also accurately characterized as shame cultures. In cultures so
constituted, shame leads to the type of low social and community
status that is to be avoided at all costs. There is a certain type of
internal irrationality to honor in shame cultures when one's dignity
as an honorable person is perceived to be under assault. This
characteristic is exemplified by the fact that in an honor culture,
when such dignity is at stake, "'[w]hoever feels dishonored cannot
be talked out of it, or reasoned with'' 62 by any rational or logical
argument that does not appreciate the enormous importance of the
imperative of shame avoidance and the defense of assaults on
personal and community dignity as a fundamental matter of human
rights. This is true because, from the perspective of honor cultures,
public displays of humiliation and .'[s]hame sear[] the soul,"' and
have 'to be wiped out and avenged in a public way that all can
63
witness and appreciate. No cost is too great for this end."'
In an honor culture, honor should thus be understood as an
enormously powerful social, political, and economic force that
defines, binds, and motivates. This power is clear and manifest
both to those who are within "the circle of honor" 64 and those who
are outside of it. The power of honor so understood can supply a
sense of meaning, strength, and comfort to those within the circle
and thus "serve[s] all members of society in a world of chronic
65
mistrust, particularly so at times of crises, great or small."
Beyond the choice of labels, the fundamental concepts of human
rights, honor, and respect are deeply bred in the human psyche and
have had a greater or lesser degree of resonance in every culture,
but especially so in honor cultures. It is important to note that, as
Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen point out, "almost all societies value
honor defined as precedence or status. The culture of honor differs
from other cultures in that violence will be used to attain and
protect this kind of honor." 66 At some level, the drive to achieve
public honor and respect is not a social extravagance or personal
indulgence, but rather can be accurately characterized as a
fundamental human need and therefore a basic human right in
every culture. However, this sense of its human rights authority is
note 57 and accompanying text.
62 BOWLAN, supra note 34, at 27 (quoting Pryce-Jones, supra note 57, at 38).
6 Id. (quoting Pryce-Jones, supra note 57, at 38).
64 WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR, supra note 56, at xv.
65

Id.

66

RICHARD E. NISBETT & Dov COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE

IN THE SOUTH 4-5 (1996).
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most strongly expressed and exaggerated in honor cultures. Thus,
everything that is true about a sense of dignity, honor, and respect
generally is significantly amplified in the social and political
contexts of honor cultures.
As Sharon Krause has persuasively observed, far from being "an
artifact of particular cultures and eras," honor is "a lens through
which to view fundamental features of human nature and
politics. ' 67 A sense of personal honor and respect has historically
been and continues to be a critical source of human and political
agency and therefore exerts a powerful influence on the motives to
enter into political life, as well as both the form and substance of
law and society. 68 Plato recognized the human need for honor and
respect, or recognition, in his tripartite organization of the soul. As
David Brooks accurately observed in a recent article in the New
York Times:
Plato famously divided the soul into three parts: reason,
eros (desire) and thymos (the hunger for recognition).
Thymos is what motivates the best and worst things men do.
It drives them to seek glory and assert themselves
aggressively for noble causes. It drives them to rage if others
don't recognize their worth. Sometimes it even causes them
to kill over a trifle if they feel disrespected.
... [T]hymos

is

the

psychological

origin

of political

action. 69
In this way, honor can be seen as a reflection of a natural instinct
to bond and protect. As it is natural, it is also a universal yearning
that speaks to every individual at a very deep level. Wyatt-Brown
captures this sense of the universality of the longing for honor by
calling it a "prehistoric code," 7 which was, in effect, baked in the
primal genes.
He colorfully describes this primal code in the
following terms: "Ever since man first picked up a stone to fling at
an enemy, he has justified his thirst for revenge and for popular
71
approval on the grounds of honor."

67

SHARON R. KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 21 (2002).

68 Id. at 20-21.
69 David Brooks, Op-Ed., All Politics is Thymotic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, §4, at 12. In a

correction printed in the New York Times four days later, Brooks asserted that "epithymia,"
not "eros," was the word Plato used "to signify the appetitive part of the soul." David Brooks,
Op-Ed., All Politics is Thymotic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at A25.
70 WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR, supra note 56, at xviii.
71 Id.
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III. RESPECT
The value of respect is similar to, but distinct from, both honor
and dignity. While honor consists of the esteem that one enjoys in
the eyes of their fellows, respect reflects the degree to which one is
considered by them to be worthy or deserving of honor. 7 2 Therefore,
respect is a prerequisite to the earning of honor. Thus, it is possible
to have respect without having honor, but it is not possible to have
honor without having respect.
The laws and imperatives of honor are well known, revered and
practiced by the male members of an honor culture, and form the
basis for the verbal weapons of political and social combat, short of
physical violence, among them. However, the imperatives of honor
can and do often justify the use of physical violence in order to
defend or restore honor in the face of insults. 73 This defense is often
carried out in the form of blood duels in which death is a frequent
result of affronts to the respect that one feels deserving of.
However, it is not necessarily dying in the defense of respect that
reflects the essence of the honor society's value system, but rather
the willingness to die to defend or redeem honor.
Such
demonstrations of the willingness to redeem affronts to one's
respect, and thus to one's honor, at the risk of death demonstrated
to the community that an individual so valued the respect of others
that he was willing to sacrifice his most precious possession-his
life-in order to defend and redeem it.
IV. THE ARAB AND PALESTINIAN HONOR CULTURE

The dictates of honor can so exhaust the social landscape that
they have the power to go beyond mere elements of a culture, and
instead dominate and constitute the essential building blocks of an
entire culture. When this happens, the analysis shifts from a
consideration of the behavior of individuals within a culture who
seek simply honor, to what are generally described as entirely
"honor-based cultures." 74 In an honor culture, "there [is] no higher
75
goal than honor and glory and its corollary of shame avoidance."

72

Kamir, supra note 21, at 239, 245.

73 See supra Part II.
74 WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE 179 (2000) [hereinafter MILLER, THE
MYSTERY OF COURAGE].
75 Id.; see also ROLAND MULLER, HONOR AND SHAME: UNLOCKING THE DOOR 98 (2000)

(discussing honor and shame as opposite values in Arab cultures); JEROME H. NEYREY, HONOR
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Because of the cultural norms that honor cultures develop, as it has
been accurately observed, the natural dynamic of an "[h]onor
culture erases any meaningful distinction between service to some
noble principle and the avoidance of shame or the acquisition of
honor. The entire moral order is subsumed under the larger goal of
honor. ' 76 Although it may be foreign to many contemporary
sensibilities, quite literally in an honor culture, there is "no higher
principle" 77 than personal and thus publicly acknowledged honor.
In Arab honor cultures, honor is at once both individualistic and
collectivist in nature. In its individualistic aspect, each person is
responsible for his own honor and must constantly be on guard
against his own acts and the offenses of others that threaten to
damage his public persona by dishonor. 78 At the same time, they
are also deeply collectivist in the sense that "[a]t every level the
interests of individuals [are] subordinated to the interests of the
group." 79 In this way, "[hionour was not a measure of individual
moral qualities; it pertained to families, not individuals, and was a
In this
relationship between a family and the community."8 0
collectivist sense, the essential quality of honor "was what the
community saw when it looked at the family, what it said about it

and how it behaved towards

it."81

To the extent that honor in Arab

cultures is regarded as a family value rather than an individualistic
82
value, it was also associated with "Arab or Islamic... 'manhood."'
Therefore, from the Arab perspective, honor is also "a male value
because it was through its men that a family related with the wider
world. '8 3 This masculine foundation of honor is at the heart of what
Bowman describes as 'tyranny of the face."' 8 4 From the perspective
of Arab masculinity, "'it [is] an affront to [male] honor to suffer loss
of face' which 'leads an Arab to do everything possible not to show

AND SHAME IN THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW 8-9, 83, 89 (1998) (describing the values of honor
and shame in Mediterranean communities of antiquity); WYATnT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR,
supra note 56, at xiv (describing honor and shame as opposite concepts).
MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE, supra note 74, at 179.
77 Id.
78 See BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 27.
79 KITTY WARNOCK, LAND BEFORE HONOUR: PALESTINIAN WOMEN
TERRITORIES 20 (1990).
76

IN THE OCCUPIED

80 Id. at 22.
81 Id.

BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 22.
WARNOCK, supra note 79, at 23.
84 BOWMAN,
supra note 34, at 27 (quoting Mansour Khalid, The Sociocultural
Determinants of Arab Diplomacy, in ARAB AND AMERICAN CULTURES 123, 128 (George N.
Atiyeh ed., 1977)).
82
8
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his troubles to those close to him, let alone his enemies.' ' 5
From the traditional Arab perspective,
[h]onour also related to land and to qualities associated with
land: stability and long history, plentiful sons, good
husbandry. "Ma illu ard, fish 'indu 'ard"-"He who has no
land has no honour"-is a saying that has gained poignancy
since the Palestinian people lost most of their land to

Israel. 86
Traditionally, Palestinian men also had such a strong imperative
to protect their women from sexual dishonor that "many of the
Palestinian families who fled their homes [in 1948] did so ... out of
fear that their women would be raped by Zionist soldiers."8 7 Thus,
the desire to protect their women, however irrational it may have
been, "was more important than defending their homes or showing
personal bravery and defiance. 88 However, contemporaneously,
"[tihis Achilles' heel of national resistance was subsequently
acknowledged and condemned in a reversal of the old saying: 'Al-ard
89
qabil al-' ard'-'Land before Honour."'
At the core of the Palestinian resistance and frustration is a
profound sense of being dishonored and disrespected by Israel and
the United States, which Palestinians experience as a direct and
immediate assault on their dignity. The connection between honor
and dignity for the Palestinians is that when they perceive that
their honor is lost or taken by the actions of Israelis, it is also
perceived as an assault on their dignity-which demands protection
and defense. Palestinians generally perceive that these assaults
come from the treatment of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers, the
Israeli Supreme Court's responses to Palestinian petitions for
judicial relief, and the actions of the Israeli government and
individual Israeli citizens in the occupied lands.
As Steven
Erlanger observed, it is important to appreciate the significance of
"the patriarchal nature of Palestinian society, and the deep
humiliation suffered by [the men] who cannot protect [their]
famil[ies] from invasion, incursion, poverty, unemployment and
fear. 'The fathers feel shame, but so do the sons' ....
'The sons

85
86
87

Id. (quoting Khalid, supra note 84, at 128).
WARNOCK, supra note 79, at 22.
Id. at 23.

8s Id.
89

Id.
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become martyrs, not the fathers."' 90 Erlanger goes on to note that
in the eyes of many Palestinian leaders, "the spilling of blood for the
cause of Palestinian independence and dignity ... is an inevitable,
even necessary sacrifice." 91
The victory that these sacrifices seek is a convergence of "[tiwo
phenomena... : 'personal revenge and the national project."' 92 This
come
when
victory,
many
Palestinians
believe,
"will
Israel.. . come[s] to terms with Palestinian nationalism and
93
negotiate[s] a future with an enemy it has been forced to respect."
This kind of respect can, in fact, be forged between enemies by the
acknowledgement of resistance by a worthy adversary, and, thereby,
even in defeat, honor is redeemed and restored and the assault on
dignity is repelled.
The views that Professor Dershowitz describes as emanating from
the "radical naysayers" 94 of peace among the Palestinians, in my
view, involve more elements of the restoration of Palestinian honor,
and the cessation of what they perceive as the Israeli assault on
Palestinian dignity, than a total physical destruction of the Israeli
state. In their minds, it is the value of Palestinian honor and an
Israeli state that are fundamentally incompatible, not a physical
Palestine and the mere existence of the Israeli state. However, this
incompatibility on both grounds is ill-founded. This is true because
from one perspective it can be argued that the core of the problem in
this conflict is the overemphasis, on both sides, on a mutually
exclusive rhetoric of peace instead of an emphasis on a dialogue
framed in the grammar of honor and dignity. In this way the
debate can be aimed not at an indefinable and unattainable "peace,"
that neither side in the conflict can agree on, but rather on the
perhaps more achievable goal of the mutual restoration of honor
and a demonstrable respect for human dignity.
V. ISRAELI HONOR AND DIGNITY

While the Arab culture is correctly characterized as an honor
90 Steven Erlanger, A Life of Unrest:Khaled Abu Hilal's Journey is Gaza's Journey: Bleak,
Violent and Headed Nowhere Hopeful, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 42, 47
Dahbour),
available
at
(quoting
Palestinian
poet
Ahmed
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/magazine/15HAMAS-t.html.
91 Id. at 44.
92 Id.
at 47 (quoting his interviewee, Khaled Abu Hilal).
93 Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
94 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 4 (describing "[e]xtremism" on both sides of the conflict as
the "enem[ies] of peace").
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culture, the United States and the Western powers are post-honor
cultures. However, modern Israel can be more accurately described
as a transitionary honor culture. This is true because, throughout
most of its history, the Jewish people living in small insular groups
bore all the marks of a traditional honor culture. However, after the
founding of the Israeli state, technological modernization, and loss
of a sense of group insularity, many of these values have faded and
been replaced by Western post-honor values. This transition in
Israel has been described by Orit Kamir as an important but often
95
unexpressed "issue within.., the Israeli culture war."
Moreover, in her view, this culture war within Israel is
"sufficiently fundamental to be viewed as an ideological
revolution." 96 The core of this ideological revolution represents a
"dramatic shift" away from Israel's militaristic "honor mentality and
in the direction of embracing the universalistic value of human
dignity, [which] is no less than a new conceptualization of the
premises underlying the self-definition of the state of Israel." 97
Against this historic and political background of honor, it would
seem that Israel would be the one Western power that should most
understand and appreciate the honor culture imperatives of both
the Palestinian people specifically, and their Arab neighbors more
generally.
Perhaps one of the underlying reasons for modern Israel's
disassociation from its roots as an honor culture lies in the fact that,
for a variety of historical reasons associated with its creation, Israel
does not have a formal constitution that expresses its fundamental
cultural and traditional founding principles. However, it does have
what might be described as fragments of a constitution in the form
of 'Basic Laws" that have from time to time been enacted by the
Israeli parliament or Knesset. 98 In 1992, the Knesset passed what
Orit Kamir has described in an incisive essay on the subject of
Israeli honor as "a basic law that has some features of a charter of
human rights, and which is often considered to be the country's bill
of rights: hok yesod kvod ha-adam ve-heruto, officially translated to
'Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty."' 99
By enacting this basic law, the Knesset gave constitutional status

95 Kamir, supra note 21, at 235.
96

Id.

97 Id.

98 Id. at 233.
99 Id.
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to what it suggested were the pre-existing fundamental Israeli
socio-cultural values of human dignity and liberty. However, there
are more than a few problems with this linguistic and cultural
formulation of Israel's basic societal values. As Kamir points out in
her essay, at the core of the problems with this articulation is that
"[i]n contemporary, Israeli Hebrew, the root k-v-d, the word kavod
and the phrase kvod ha-adam are fraught with meanings and
connotations, assimilated together beyond clear distinction." 100
Kamir's analysis leads her to conclude that "while the Hebrew herut
is easily translated to 'liberty,' the translation of kvod ha-adam to
'dignity' is substantially inaccurate" because it masks and conceals
10 1
"the Hebrew term's full range of meanings."
There are both historical and cultural distinctions that are
masked by the Knesset's use of these terms in the Basic Law. This
masking effect is captured in Kamir's argument that "[t]he
translation of kvod ha-adam to 'human dignity' conveniently
associates the Basic Law with the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. But in fact, although the combined phrase kvod haadam does connote 'human dignity,' the word kavod is also the only
Hebrew term for 'honor,' 'glory' and 'respect."' 10 2 She therefore
concludes that "[i]n Israeli culture and society, as well as in Israeli
law, human dignity (kvod ha-adam) is, therefore, inseparable
from-while sometimes at variance with-these other values,
representing distinct sentiments and value systems."'1 3
This
distinction is both subtle and important since, as Kamir argues,
because of "the unique multi-layered concept [of] kvod ha-adam,"
"[t]he Basic Law's 'dignity-honor-glory-respect' is not exactly the
104
Universal Declaration's 'dignity."'
As reflected in Kamir's essay, there are three related but distinct
meanings of the word kavod in Israeli culture, which correspond to
three separate and warring factions in the Israeli culture war. The
first is one that she describes as "kavod-honor,"'10 5 which consists of
the traditionalists "who remain devoted to Israel's Zionist kavodhonor culture."'1 6 This traditionalist view is based on the "stain of

100Id. at 236.
101 Id. at 233.
102
103

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

104 Id.
See supra text accompanying note 20 for the precise relevant language of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
105 Kamir, supra note 21, at 234.
106

Id.
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shame and humiliation on collective Jewish identity" from the
Holocaust.107 The most striking characteristic of this traditional
sense of kavod-honor is the Zionist insistence on "overcoming this
acute national degradation.., mainly through the military power of
108
the Jewish state."
The second of these "feuding camps" 10 9 is what Kamir calls
1 1 0 The unifying and distinguishing characteristic
"kavod-dignity."
of this group consists of the "shift [in] emphasis from the Zionist
honor mentality towards a more universalistic human dignity (kvod
ha-adam) oriented culture" where "Israel should reformulate its
'Jewishness' and become 'a state of all its citizens,' Jews and Arabs
alike .... as a secular political entity, where state and church are
separate." ''
The third and final of these warring camps "is
composed of Israeli Jews for whom kavod is above all glory" which
"implies a rabbinical, religious, ('pre-Zionist') Jewish ideology, which
attributes Man's glory to his heavenly creation in the divine image
12
of God."1
However, with very little public debate among these warring
cultural camps, "in enacting the Basic Law kvod ha-adam ve-heruto,
the Knesset ... signaled a socio-cultural shift of emphasis from the
logic of kavod-honor to the logic of (kvod ha-adam) human
dignity." 11 3 Kamir argues that this shift in emphasis "is sufficiently
fundamental to be viewed as an ideological revolution" and "no less
than a new conceptualization of the premises underlying the selfdefinition of the state of Israel," which "was not explicitly declared,
publicly acknowledged nor widely embraced."1 1 4 This almost back
door shift through changes manifested in the Basic Law, is all the
more
noteworthy
because,
as
Jane
Falk
points
out,
"[a]rgumentativeness, even when accompanied by raised voices, is a
way of life for Israelis. It is a sociable enterprise, perpetuated
perhaps by the culture of Talmudic study halls where students
partner to argue the finest points of Jewish law."1 1 5 Similarly,
Professor Dershowitz also observed this characteristic of Jewish life

107

108
109

Id.
Id.
Id.

110 Id.
111 Id.

Id. at 234-35.
11 Id. at 235.
114 Id.
11- Jane Falk, Taking Liberties, in WHAT ISRAEL MEANS TO ME, supra note 4, at 112, 116.
112
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in Israel when he said that "[tlhe great writer Amos Oz was once
asked what commodity is most prevalent in Israel, and he
116
answered, 'Good Argument."'
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that, had this fundamental
shift in Israeli culture represented by the Basic Law been aired for
public debate before it was passed, it would have engendered a good
deal of national 'Good Argument."' 117 However, since it was not
subject to such public debate, Kamir poses a poignant question
when she asks "whether fundamental ideological shifts, such as the
one from honor to dignity, can and should be led or executed by the
legal system, when significant portions of the population are either
118
unaware or unaccepting of the new premises."
One of the implications from this publicly unacknowledged shift
in legal emphasis is manifested in the extent to which the Israeli
Supreme Court has accepted and favorably ruled on Palestinian
claims against ill treatment by the Israeli state. For example, in
response to a direct petition from a number of human rights groups,
"Israel's Supreme Court [recently] ordered the government to justify
its decision to impose economic sanctions on the Gaza Strip" on the
basis of a violation of international law against mass
punishments.1 1 9 Similarly, an Israeli human rights group recently
petitioned the Supreme Court, challenging the military's policy of
not allowing 670 Palestinian youths to leave the Gaza strip to
attend colleges and universities outside of the country. 120 In short,
the "Basic Law kvod ha-adam ve-heruto seems to have encouraged
the legal system's tendency to withdraw from its honor mentality
and to develop a dignity discourse." 121 As a result of this shift from
an honor discourse to one grounded in dignity, Israeli society and its
legal system seem poised to be much more sensitive to Palestinian
claims of being disrespected, dishonored, and having their dignity
assaulted by actions of the Israeli military and State actions. This
is the sense in which Israeli society can be accurately described as
an honor culture in transition-from a militaristic sense of honor to
116

Dershowitz, supra note 4, at 5.

117

Id.

1i Kamir, supra note 21, at 236.
119 Court Orders Israel to Justify Gaza Sanctions, AFX NEWS LIMITED,

Oct. 29, 2007,

http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2007/10/29/afx4272414.html.
120 Gaza Students Petition Court to Stop "Collective Punishment",MIDDLE E. TIMES, Oct.
10,
2007,
http://www.metimes.com/International/2007/1O/22/gaza-students_petition-courtto
stop-colle
ctive punishment/9257.
121 Kamir, supra note 21, at 257.
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one grounded in Universalist notions of human dignity.
VI. CONCLUSION

There is a real and growing social and political constituency
within Israel for the recognition and extension to the Palestinians of
a universalist conception of human rights. As Rabbi Shmuley
Boteach has persuasively observed, "Israel remains for me the
embodiment and personification not just of Jewish, but humanity's
hopes.... It might sound strange that a rabbi would view Israel as
the apogee of human, rather than just Jewish, striving, but I have
long believed in Israel's universalism." 122 Like Rabbi Boteach,
regardless of how small and fragile a voice Jewish universalism may
be, like many true believers, I remain sincerely convinced that
although frustratingly elusive, it will ultimately be the key to peace
in the Middle East. However, it will never be achieved within the
current Israeli rhetorical failure to frame the debate, at least to
some extent, in terms of the recognition of Palestinian dignity and a
restoration of Palestinian respect and honor. These goals are
simultaneously glaringly simple and enormously complex.
However, in my view they are essential threshold requirements to a
lasting and sustainable peace, because a peace which does not
recognize the inherent dignity of the enemy and does not afford
them respect and honor is no peace at all, and is not worth having
on any other terms.

122

Shmuley Boteach, in WHAT ISRAEL MEANS TO ME, supra note 4, at 65, 66-67.
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